



Consortium for IT Software Quality™

Automating Software Quality Measurement with Standards

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CISQ Webinar — May 15, 2019

Nine Digit Defects

- Knights Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It \$440 Million**
By NATHANIEL POPPER AUGUST 2, 2012 9:07 AM
- REUTERS** U.S. News & Markets Sectors & Industries
London Stock Exchange crippled by system outage
- Features**
Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It
By Michael Riley, Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence, and Carol Matlack | March 13, 2014
- AP** November 15, 2010, 12:39 PM
United Airlines has another large computer outage


now affect

Board of Directors
CEO, COO, CFO
Business VPs
Corporate Auditors
CIO

accountable for

Governance
Risk management
Business Continuity
Brand protection
Customer experience


Evaluate Application Risk with CISQ Measures



Why Do Software-Intensive System Projects Fail ?



Modern Apps are a Technology Stack



1 Unit Level


- Code style & layout
- Expression complexity
- Code documentation
- Class or program design
- Basic coding standards
- Developer level

2 Technology Level

- Single language/technology layer
- Intra-technology architecture
- Intra-layer dependencies
- Inter-program invocation
- Security vulnerabilities
- Development team level

3 System Level

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| ▪ Integration quality | ▪ Function point |
| ▪ Architectural compliance | ▪ Effort estimation |
| ▪ Risk propagation | ▪ Data access control |
| ▪ Application security | ▪ SDK versioning |
| ▪ Resiliency checks | ▪ Calibration across technologies |
| ▪ Transaction integrity | ▪ IT organization level |





CISQ Sponsors







CISQ Partners






- Mirrors IFPUG counting guidelines, but automatable
- Specification developed by international team led by David Herron of David Consulting Group
- Submitted thru OMG's fasttrack as ISO 19515



Automated Function Points is now an ISO/IEC standard

CISQ Structural Quality Measures



An international team of experts selected the weaknesses to include in CISQ measures based on the severity of their impact on operational problems or cost of ownership.

Only weaknesses considered severe enough they must be remediated were included in the CISQ measures.

CISQ Structural Quality measures have been extended to embedded systems software

| CWE # | Descriptor | Weakness description |
|--------|---|--|
| CWE-22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') | The software uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the software does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. |
| CWE-23 | Relative Path Traversal | The software uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory. |
| CWE-36 | Absolute Path Traversal | The software uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize absolute path sequences such as "/abs/path" that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory. |
| CWE-77 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | The software constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
| CWE-78 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') | The software constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
| CWE-88 | Argument Injection or Modification | The software does not sufficiently delimit the arguments being passed to a component in another control sphere, allowing alternate arguments to be provided, leading to potentially security-relevant changes. |

- **With all the functionality being embedded on chips, the line between embedded and IT software is blurring**
- **All CISQ weaknesses are now identified with CWE numbers (ITU-T X.1524; UN standards body)**
- **Some CISQ weaknesses presented in parent-child relationships**
- **Attempting to get CISQ quality measures referenced in revision of ISO/IEC 25023**

Embedded extensions




| Quality Attribute | Parent weaknesses | Child weaknesses | Previous weaknesses |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Reliability | 36 | 38 | 29 |
| Security | 36 | 37 | 22 |
| Performance | 16 | 3 | 15 |
| Maintainability | 30 | 1 | 20 |
| Totals | 118 | 79 | 86 |

Correlation of Total Quality Index and log of incidents for 21 applications in a large global system integrator


$R^2 = .34$
Total Quality Index
accounts for 1/3 of
variation in incidents

Increase in Total
Quality Index of .24
decreased corrective
maintenance effort 50%



The Technical Debt Metaphor

Technical Debt — the future cost of repairing must-fix defects remaining in code at release, a component of the cost of ownership





Lost opportunity—benefits that could have been achieved had resources been put on new capability rather than retiring technical debt

Liability—business costs related to outages, breaches, corrupted data, and other damaging incidents


Interest—continuing IT costs attributable to the violations causing technical debt, i.e, higher maintenance costs, greater resource usage, etc.

Principal—cost of fixing problems remaining in the code after release that must be remediated





- **ISO/IEC 25010** defines a software product quality model of 8 quality characteristics
- **CISQ conforms to ISO/IEC 25010** quality characteristic definitions
- **ISO/IEC 25023** defines measures, but not automatable or at the source code level
- **CISQ supplements ISO/IEC 25023** with automatable source code level measures





CISQ automated structural quality measures are highlighted in blue

CISQ and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

| Function Unique Identifier | Function | Category Unique Identifier | Category |
|----------------------------|----------|----------------------------|---|
| ID | Identify | ID.AM | Asset Management |
| | | ID.BE | Business Environment |
| | | ID.GV | Governance |
| | | ID.RA | Risk Assessment |
| | | ID.RM | Risk Management Strategy |
| | | ID.SC | Supply Chain Risk Management |
| PR | Protect | PR.AC | Identity Management and Access Control |
| | | PR.AT | Awareness and Training |
| | | PR.DS | Data Security |
| | | PR.IP | Information Protection Processes and Procedures |
| | | PR.MA | Maintenance |
| | | PR.PT | Protective Technology |
| DE | Detect | DE.AE | Anomalies and Events |
| | | DE.CM | Security Continuous Monitoring |
| | | DE.DP | Detection Processes |
| RS | Respond | RS.RP | Response Planning |
| | | RS.CO | Communications |
| | | RS.AN | Analysis |
| | | RS.MI | Mitigation |
| | | RS.IM | Improvements |
| RC | Recover | RC.RP | Recovery Planning |
| | | RC.IM | Improvements |
| | | RC.CO | Communications |

The CISQ Security measure (and others) can be used in numerous processes of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Some examples:

- ← Empirical risk tolerance thresholds for software security
- ← Contractual SLAs and audits for software security
- ← Evaluation of software assets for security weaknesses
- ← Continual improvement of software security
- ← Periodic scans for software weaknesses
- ← Software security and weakness data are shared
- ← Security weaknesses are identified and mitigated



- **CISQ/OMG**
 - only assess vendor conformance
 - do not certify applications
 - program initiated in 2017
- **Service providers**
 - use CISQ-conformant technology
 - in a CISQ-conformant service process
 - to provide application certifications

Application Certification

| | |
|-----------------|----|
| Security | Xσ |
| Reliability | Xσ |
| Performance | Xσ |
| Maintainability | Xσ |

Objective — Define quality measures based on counting severe architectural and design weaknesses that can be detected through analyzing formal models developed in Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) languages and technologies.

Two Focii —

1. **Quality of the architecture:**
 - Architecture analysis might be the only way to find some weaknesses
 - Find other weaknesses earlier at the architectural level
2. **Quality of the model of the architecture**

Sources —

1. **Architectural-level CWEs**
2. **Lists of architecture-level antipatterns**
3. **Vendor and system architect weakness lists or experiences**

TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEMS MANIFESTO



As a greater portion of mission, business, and safety critical functionality is committed to software-intensive systems, these systems become one of, if not the largest source of risk to enterprises and their customers. Since corporate executives are ultimately responsible for managing this risk, we establish the following principles to govern system development and deployment.

1. **Engineering discipline in product and process**
2. **Quality assurance to risk tolerance thresholds**
3. **Traceable properties of system components**
4. **Proactive defense of the system and its data**
5. **Resilient and safe operations**

AUTOMATABLE STANDARDS FOR SOFTWARE MEASUREMENT

Over 2000 individual members from large software-intensive organizations:

