9th Annual Cyber Resilience Summit

Hosted by: Dr. Bill Curtis Mr. Luke McCormack CISQ

Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

9TH CISQ CYBER RESILIENCE SUMMIT



Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™


OCTOBER 12, 2021

HOSTS: BILL CURTIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CONSORTIUM FOR INFORMATION & SOFTWARE QUALITY

LUKE MCCORMACK FORMER CIO DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY



What Is CISQ ?



QuEST


IAOP

CHWELL

MAKING SOFTWARE

QA

CISQ CISQ's History of Software Standards



CISQ CISQ's Future Standards

- Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)
- Automated Source Code Data Protection Measure
- Flow and Modernization Measures for Agile/DevOps Environments
- Updated Automated Technical Debt Measure
- Process Maturity Metamodel
- Dependable Programmer Certification

CISQ www.it-cisq.org — Membership Is Free



- Almost 4000 individual members from Fortune 1000 organizations
- Contents:
 - Approved standards
 - Contract language
 - Trustworthy Systems Manifesto
 - Presentations
 - Webinars
 - Tutorials
 - Whitepapers
 - Use Cases
 - Blogs
 - News
 - Current standards projects
 - Process Maturity Metamodel
 - Upcoming events
- Cyber Resilience Summits

KEYNOTE: IS TECHNOLOGY THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM? TECHNICAL DECISION POINTS ON THE JOURNEY TO RESPONSIBLE COMPUTING

PRESENTED BY:

MARC PETERS DISTINGUISHED ENGINEER, CTO FOR ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT & UTILITIES EMEA, IBM



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GAINING INSIGHT INTO CYBERSECURITY MATURITY

PRESENTED BY:

RON ZAHAVI CHIEF STRATEGIST FOR IOT STANDARDS, MICROSOFT

MATTHEW JAMES BUTKOVIC TECHNICAL DIRECTOR, SEI

SAMMY MIGUES PRINCIPAL SCIENTIST, THE SYNOPSYS SOFTWARE INTEGRITY GROUP



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CMMC AND SMM

CISQ

Consortium for Information & Software Quality[™]

PRESENTED BY: Ron Zahavi, Chief Strategist for IoT standards, Microsoft Azure IoT, SMM co-author October 2021




- What are they?
- What's similar?
- What's different?
- Complementary use




- CMMC: The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) is a new cybersecurity framework and accompanying certification by the US Department of Defense (DoD). The goal of the new CMMC compliance requirement is to protect Federal Contract Information (FCI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).
- SMM: The Internet of Things (IoT) Security Maturity Model (SMM) builds on the concepts identified in the Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) and provides a path for IoT providers to understand where they need to be, make intelligent choices about which mechanisms to use and how to invest in the mechanisms to meet their needs




























Domain



Practice


Subdomain





CMMC


- US Government based
- Guidelines for protection of government IP by vendors
- Certification of compliance
- Improvement between levels, reaching a higher level



SMM • Int

- For evaluating security of IoT solutions (sensors to the cloud including IT/OT/IoT)
- Certification of assessment companies that want to evaluate solutions
- Levels match need and investment goals, identify the right level
- Profiles and mappings

International





- Extending the scope to create an industry profile
- Make general considerations more specific
- Add more detail
- Provide guidance on "what needs to be done"
- Provide industry specific detail on "indicators of accomplishment"
- System-specific guidance can also be added for a system or a device

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-	Comprehensiveness Level 1 (Minimum)	Comprehensiveness Level 2 (Ad Hoc)	Comprehensiveness Level 3 (Consistent)	Comprehensiveness Level 4 (Formalized)
Objective	Objective Description	Objective Description	Objective Description	Objective Description
General	Level Description	iption Level Description Level Description		Level Description
considerations	What needs to be done to achieve this level Considerations			
	Indicators of accomplishment	Indicators of accomplishment Considerations	Indicators of accomplishment Considerations	Indicators of accomplishment

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	Comprehensiveness	Comprehensiveness	Comprehensiveness	Comprehensiveness
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
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specific	industry specific	industry specific	industry specific	industry specific
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System-specif consideration		<list 2="" level="" of="" system<br="">specific considerations></list>	<list 3="" level="" of="" system<br="">specific considerations></list>	<list 4="" level="" of="" system<br="">specific considerations></list>



Relating SMM to familiar and accepted work

- SMM is a maturity model, so it does not include specific security controls
- Mappings take SMM "actions to be taken" and "indicators of accomplishment" for the maturity levels and relate them to control frameworks and best practices
- You can identify your desired maturity level for a given practice and appropriate controls that are relevant for it

Comprehensiveness Level 1 (Minimum) SR 1.1 (5.3) - Human	Comprehensiveness Level 2 (Ad-Hoc)	Comprehensiveness Level 3 (Consistent)	Comprehensivenes
SP 1 1 (5 2) - Human			Lever + (rormanze
user identification and authentication SR 1.3 (5.5) - Account management SR 1.6 (5.8) - Wireless access management SR 1.7 (5.9) - Strongth of passwo SR 1.10 (5 Authentica feedback	SR 1.1 RE 1 (5.3.3.1) - Unique identification and authentication SR 1.2 (5.4) - Software process and device identification and authentication SR 1 - 4.3.1) - Ui e ider. ation and then' sion SR : '	SR 1.1 RE 2 (5.3.3.2) - Multifactor authentication for untrusted networks SR 1.3 RE 1	SR 1.5 RE 1 (5.7.3.1) - Hardware security for software process software pr



- SMM Profiles
 - Extensions for different industries and purposes, for example
 - Retail
 - Digital Twins
- Mappings, for example
 - To other control security frameworks
 - ISA 62443 for different roles
- Could create SMM profile for CMMC to leverage SMM assessment approaches and mappings (such as for 62443) to identify gaps and possible controls for achieving CMMC levels
- Could combine SMM and CMMS certification review as part of an assessment, creates more consistency
- Call to action: let's create an SMM CMMC profile



- SMM Main page: <u>Security Maturity Model Practitioners' Guide</u> <u>Industry IoT Consortium (iiconsortium.org)</u>
- SMM White Paper: <u>IoT SMM: Description and Intended Use</u> (iiconsortium.org)
- SMM Practitioner's Guide: <u>IoT SMM Practitioner's Guide</u> (iiconsortium.org)
- SMM Retail Profile: <u>IoT SMM: Retail Profile for Point-of-Sale Devices</u> (iiconsortium.org)

CMMC AND BSIMM




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PRESENTED BY: Sammy Migues, Principal Scientist, Synopsys; BSIMM co-author and analyst

October 2021



- What are they?
- What's similar?
- What's different?
- Complementary use
- Data



- The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) is a new cybersecurity framework and accompanying certification by the US Department of Defense (DoD). The goal of the new CMMC compliance requirement is to protect Federal Contract Information (FCI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).
- The Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) is a descriptive, datadriven model resulting from an ongoing study—since 2008—of actual practices in application security programs across many organization sizes, industry verticals, and geographies. It's both a yardstick for measuring programs and a guide for creating them.

CISO **BSIMM** Domains and Practices CMMC Domains DOMAINS Incident Risk Access Control Response Management (AC) GOVERNANCE INTELLIGENCE SSDL TOUCHPOINTS DEPLOYMENT (IR) (RM) Practices that help Practices that result in Practices associated Practices that interface Asset Security collections of corporate with analysis and organize, manage, and with traditional Maintenance knowledge used in assurance of particular network security and measure a software Management Assessment (MA) carrying out software security initiative. software development software maintenance (AM) (CA) Staff development security activities artifacts and processes. organizations. Software is also a central throughout the All software security configuration, methodologies include organization. Collections maintenance, and other governance practice. Awareness and Situational include both proactive these practices. environment issues **Media Protection** Training security guidance have direct impact on Awareness (MP) and organizational software security. (AT) (SA) threat modeling. PRACTICES Audit and Personnel System and Accountability Security Communications GOVERNANCE INTELLIGENCE SSDL TOUCHPOINTS DEPLOYMENT (AU) (PS) Protection (SC) 1. Strategy & Metrics 7. Architecture Analysis 10. Penetration Testing 4. Attack Models (SM) (AM) (AA) (PT) Configuration Physical System and Protection 2. Compliance & Policy 5. Security Features 8. Code Review 11. Software Environment Management Information (CP) (CR) (SE) & Design (CM) (PE) Integrity (SI) (SFD) 3. Training 9. Security Testing 12. Configuration Management & (T) 6. Standards & (ST) Identification and Vulnerability Requirements Recovery (SR) Management Authentication (RE) (CMVM) (IA)

Model domains

26



BSIMM Domains and Practices CMMC Domains DOMAINS Incident Risk Access Control Response Management (AC) INTELLIGENCE SSDL TOUCHPOINTS DEPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE (IR) (RM) Practices that help Practices that result in Practices associated Practices that interface Asset Security collections of corporate with analysis and organize, manage, and with traditional Maintenance knowledge used in assurance of particular measure a software network security and Management Assessment (MA) security initiative. carrying out software software development software maintenance (AM) (CA) Staff development security activities artifacts and processes. organizations. Software is also a central throughout the All software security configuration, methodologies include organization. Collections maintenance, and other governance practice. Awareness and Situational include both proactive these practices. environment issues Media Protection Training security guidance bave direct impact on Awareness (MP) and organizational software security. (AT) (SA) threat modeling. PPACTICES Audit and Personnel System and Accountability Security Communications INTELLOENCE SSDL TOUCHPOINTS GOVERNANCE DEPLOYMENT (AU) (PS) Protection (SC) 1. Strategy & Metrics Attack Models 7 Architecture Analysis 10. Penetration Testing (SM) (AM) (AA) (PT) Configuration Physical System and Protection 2. Compliance 8 Policy 5. Security reatures 8. Code Review 11. Software Environment Management Information (CP) ∝ Design (CR) (SE) (CM) (PE) Integrity (SI) (SFD) 3. Training 9. Security Testing 12. Configuration Management & 6. Standards & (ST) (T) Identification and Vulnerability Requirements Recovery (SR) Management Authentication (RE) (CMVM) (IA)

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BSIMM Domains and Practices



	DOM	IAINS		Access Control	Incident	Risk
GOVERNANCE	INTELLIGENCE	SSDL TOUCHPOINTS	DEPLOYMENT	(AC)	Response (IR)	Management (RM)
Practices that help organize, manage, and measure a software security initiative. Staff development is also a central	Practices that result in collections of corporate knowledge used in carrying out software security activities throughout the	Practices associated with analysis and assurance of particular software development artifacts and processes. All software security	Practices that interface with traditional network security and software maintenance organizations. Software configuration	Asset Management (AM)	Maintenance (MA)	Security Assessment (CA)
governance practice.	organization. Collections include both proactive security guidance and organizational threat modeling.	methodologies include these practices. have direct impact on software security.	tware security odologies include practices. tware security configuration, maintenance, and other environment issues have direct impact on	Awareness and Training (AT)	Media Protection (MP)	Situational Awareness (SA)
PRACTICES		Audit and	Personnel	System and		
GOVERNANCE	INTELLIGENCE	SSDI TOUCHPOINTS	DEPLOYMENT	Accountability (AU)	Security (PS)	Communications Protection (SC)
 Strategy & Metrics (SM) Compliance & Policy (CP) Training 	 4. Attack Models (AM) 5. Security Features & Design (SFD) 	 7. Architecture Analysis (AA) 8. Code Review (CR) 9. Security Testing 	 10. Penetration Testing (PT) 11. Software Environment (SE) 12. Configuration 	Configuration Management (CM)	Physical Protection (PE)	System and Information Integrity (SI)
(T)	6. Standards & Requirements (SR)	(ST)	12 Configuration Management & Vulnerability Management (CMVM)	Identification and Authentication (IA)	Recovery (RE)	



BSIMM Domains and Practices

CMMC Domains

	DOM	AINS		Access Control	Incident	Risk		
GOVERNANCE	INTELLIGENCE	SSDL TOUCHPOINTS	DEPLOYMENT	(AC)	Response (IR)	Management (RM)		
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	PRACTICES		PRACTICES			Audit and	Personnel	System and
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BSIMM Domains and Practices

CMMC Domains

	DOMAINS			Access Control	Incident	Risk		
GOVERNANCE	INTELLIGENCE	SSDL TOUCHPOINTS	DEPLOYMENT	(AC)	Response (IR)	Management (RM)		
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GOVERNANCE	INTELLIGENCE	SSDL TOUCHPOINTS	DEPLOYMENT	Accountability (AU)	Security (PS)	Communications Protection (SC)		
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(Τ)	6. Standards & Requirements (SR)	(ST)	Management 🖈 Vulnerability Managemen (CMVM)	Identification and Authentication (IA)	Recovery (RE)			

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But they are different and have different context


BSIMM

- Any organization, anywhere
- Actual practices in current app security programs
- Program scorecard; self-assessments encouraged
- 122 unique activities / controls

4. Attack Models 1. Strategy & Metrics 7. Architecture Analysis 10. Penetration Testing (SM) (AM) (AA) (PT) 2. Compliance & Policy 5. Security Features 8. Code Review 11. Software Environment Model (CP) & Design (CR) (SE) (SFD) 3. Training 9. Security Testing 12. Configuration (T) 6. Standards & (ST) Management & Requirements Vulnerability (SR) Management (CMVM) TRAINING (T) Conduct software security awareness training. [T1.1] 76 59.4% Deliver on-demand individual training. [T1.7] 53 41.4% Include security resources in onboarding. [T1.8] 46 35.9% Enhance satellite through training and events. [T2.5] 39 30.5% Create and use material specific to company history. 27 [T2.8] 21.1% Deliver role-specific advanced curriculum. 35 [T2.9] 27.3% Reward progression through curriculum. [T3.1] 6 4.7% Provide training for vendors and outsourced workers. 23 18.0% [T3.2] 23 Host software security events. [T3.3] 18.0% Require an annual refresher. 24 [T3.4] 18.8% Establish SSG office hours. [T3.5] 9 7.0% Identify new satellite members through observation. [T3.6] 4 3.1%


CMMC

- DoD and defense contractors
- Cybersecurity best practices from various standards
- Certification element; self-assessments encouraged
- Level 3 includes 130 practices






	BSIMM12	BSIMM11	BSIMM10	BSIMM9	BSIMM8	BSIMM7	в
FIRMS	128	130	122	120	109	95	
MEASUREMENTS	341	357	339	320	256	237	
2ND MEASURES	31	32	50	42	36	30	
3RD MEASURES	14	12	32	20	16	15	
4TH MEASURES	4	7	8	7	5	2	
SSG MEMBERS	2,837	1,801	1,596	1,600	1,268	1,111	
SATELLITE MEMBERS	6,448	6,656	6,298	6,291	3,501	3,595	
DEVELOPERS	398,544	490,167	468,500	415,598	290,582	272,782	28
APPLICATIONS	153,519	176,269	173,233	135,881	94,802	87,244	e
AVG. SSG AGE (YEARS)	4.41	4.32	4.53	4.13	3.88	3.94	
AVG. SSG RATIO	2.59/100	2.01/100	1.37/100	1.33/100	1.60/100	1.61/100	1.



550 assessments across 231 firms since 2008 122 activities (controls) in BSIMM12



- Governance automation and governance-as-code
- Continuous defect discovery
- Security as part of resilience and quality
- Growth in software supply chain risk management



 BSIMM Main page: <u>Building Security In Maturity Model</u> (bsimm.com)

PROGRAM BREAK

CISQ

Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

15-MINUTE BREAK

PROGRAM WILL RESUME AT 10:30AM EST

THANK YOU TO OUR SPONSORS FOR MAKING THIS EVENT POSSIBLE!

DEVOPS IMPLEMENTATION



Consortium for Information & Software Quality [™]

PRESENTED BY:

Challenges in implementing and sustaining DevOps environment

Hasan Yasar Director, Lifecycle Innovation and Automation Software Engineering Institute | Carnegie Mellon University

Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute

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Challenges in Implementing and sustaining DevOps environment

• DevOps Foundation



DevOps?

DevOps is a set of principles and practices which enable better communication and collaboration between relevant stakeholders for the purpose of specifying, developing, continuously improving, and operating software and systems products and services *

Four Fundamental Principles

- 1. Collaboration: between all stakeholders
- 2. Infrastructure as code (IaC): assets are versioned, scripted, and shared
- 3. Automation: deployment, testing, provisioning, any manual or human-error-prone process
- 4. Monitoring: any metric in development or operation that can inform priorities, direction, and policy

* IEEE P2675 DevOps Standard for Building Reliable and Secure Systems Including Application Build, Package and Deployment


Dimension of DevOps

Automation/ Measurement

- Automate repetitive and error-prone tasks (e.g., build, testing, and deployment maintain consistent environments)
- Static analysis automation (architecture health)
- Performance dashboards

System Architecture

- Architected to support test automation and continuous-integration goals
- Applications that support changes without release (e.g., late binding)
- Scalable, secure, reliable, etc.



Culture


- All stakeholders collaborate
- Developers and Operations support releases beyond deployment
- Continuous learning
- Transparent and sharable
- Constant communication

Process and Practices

- Pipeline streamlining
- Continuous-delivery
 practices (e.g., continuous
 integration; test
 automation; script-driven,
 automated deployment;
 virtualized, self-service
 environments)


SW Development Phases – on each iteration/sprint

Feature Request	Requirements	Architecture	Design	Development	Test	Delivery




The DevOps Factory

- Feature to deployment
- Iterative and incremental development
- Automation in every phase of the SDLC
- Continuous feedback
- Metrics and measurement
- Complete engagement with all stakeholders
- Transparency and traceability across the lifecycle




Key Benefits of DevOps



- Reduced errors during deployment
- Reduced time to deploy and resolve discovered errors
- Repeatable steps
- **Continuous availability** of pipeline and application
- Increased innovation time
- Responsiveness to business needs
- **Traceability** throughout the application lifecycle
- Increased stability and quality
- Continuous feedback

Yearly Returns Possible from Cost Unnecessary Rework Avoided	of High IT Performer	Medium IT Performer	Low IT Performer
LARGE ORGANIZATION that relies on in-house software (8,500 technical staff)	8,500 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 1% rework = \$13.4M	8,500 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 12% rework = \$160.7M	8,500 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 7% rework = \$93.7M
MEDIUM TO LARGE TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION (2,000 technical staff)	2,000 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 1% rework = \$3.2M	2,000 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 12% rework = \$37.8M	2,000 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 7% rework = \$22.1M
SMALL TO MEDIUM BUSINESSES AND NON-TECHNICAL ENTERPRISES (250 technical staff)	250 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 1% rework = \$393.8K	250 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 12% rework = \$4.7M	250 staff x \$105,000 salary x 1.5 benefits x 7% rework = \$2.8M

*DORA, DevOps ROI



DevSecOps Community Survey 2018

7

Challenges in Implementing and sustaining DevOps environment

Obstacles & Recommendations




1. Culture



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Incentivizing Behaviors



- Blame-Free Culture
 - No Hiding of Problems
 - Culture of shared responsibility
 - Collective decision and continuous learning
- Cross-Silo Goals
 - Incentivize Collaboration
 - Reduce "Not My Job"
 - Increase Sense of Purpose
- Optimize Ease-of-Use
 - Tools: Chat, ChatOps, Wiki
 - Integrated Pipelines

2. Organizational Structure

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Conway's Law:

"How to organize our teams affects how we perform our work"

- Share common goals from top to bottom
- Enable business value oriented team
- Functional Team
- Share responsibilities (like Security is everyone's job)
- Keep team size small



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Apply DevOps to migrate Legacy Systems

- Ancient systems should be replaced.
- Installing new systems to fit in
- Build a new version instead of maintaining
- Re-architect to support incremental and iterative development
- Enable dynamic integration of systems

4	Childe Company													2 Fm AWS Amazon				
	Github 3 Os		F		50e				Database Mgr	nt	Build		r r.	а <u>г</u> .	17 0-			Web
			Fr		ium	CI	ovment		Repo Mgmt Config / Provis		Testing Containeriza	tion						10 Pd
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		20 En	21 Os	3 22	Os 23 Os	24 Os	25 Fr	26 C	s 27 Fr	28 Os	29 Pd	30 Os		32 Os	-			36 En
	GI GitLab	Rg _{Redgate}	M∨ _{Maven}	Gr Gradle	At		Se Selenium	Ga Gatling	Dh Docker Hub	Jn Jenkins	Ba Bamboo	Tr Travis Cl	Deployment	Sf SmartFrog		BC Bcfa2	Mo Mesos	Rs Backspace
			39 Os						Fr 45 Os						51 Os			54 Os
	Sv Subversion	Dm DBmaestro	Gn Grunt	Gulp	Br Broccoli	Cu Cucumber	Cj Cucumber.js	Qu _{Qunit}		Cs Codeship	Vs Visual Studio	Cr _{CircleCl}		Ju JuJu	Rd Rundeck	Cf CFEngine	Ds ^{Swarm}	Op OpenStack
	55 Os	56 En	57 Fi	r 58	Os 59 Os	60 Fr	61 Fr	62 1	Fr 63 Os	64 Fm	65 Fm	66 Os	67 En	68 Fm	69 En	70 En	71 Os	72 Fm
	Hg Mercurial	Dp _{Delphix}	Sb sbt	Mk _{Make}	Ck ^{CMake}	<mark>Jt</mark> JUnit	Jm _{JMeter}	Tn _{TestNG}	Ay Artifactory	Tc TeamCity	Sh Shippable	CC CruiseControl	Ry RapidDeploy	Cy CodeDeploy	Oc Octopus Deploy	NO CA Nolio	Kb Kubernetes	Hr _{Heroku}
	73 En CW ISPW	74 En Id Idera	75 Or MSBuild	RK Rake	Os 77 Fi Pk Packer	78 Os MC Mocha	79 Fr Km Karma	80 C Jm Jasmine	NS 81 Os NX Nexus	82 Os CO Continuum	83 Fm Ct Continua Cl	84 Pd SO Solano Cl	85 En XId XL Deploy		87 Fm Dp Deploybot	88 En Ud UrbanCode Deploy	89 Os NM Nomad	90 En OS OpenShift



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
Platform as a Service for SW development


- 12Factor is a methodology for building software-asa-service apps. <u>https://12factor.net</u>
- Heroko, <u>https://www.heroku.com</u>
- Cloud Foundry, <u>https://www.cloudfoundry.org</u>
- Pivotal, <u>https://pivotal.io</u>
- Amazon DevOps, <u>https://aws.amazon.com/devops/</u>
- Azure DevOps, <u>https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/devops/</u>
- OpenStack Open Shift, <u>https://www.openshift.com</u>
- Electric Cloud https://electric-cloud.com

Key Considerations

- Integrate-ability
- Interoperability
- Usability
- Portability
- Reliability
- Security/Permissions/AT
 O
- Availability
- Scalability

- Affordable
- Performance
- Modifiability
- Configurability
- "Automate-ability" (of manual tasks)
- "Approvability" (allows for manual approval)
- Measurability
- Adaptability
- Connectivity with other platform





4. Lack of Metrics and Measurements

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Decide what to measure

- Deployment frequency
- Change Lead time and Volume
- # of work items (tickets)
- Defect escape rate
- Mean time to detection (MTTD)
- Mean time to recovery (MTTR)
- Application performance
- Time to approval
- Time to patch vulnerabilities
- Operational Logs (IP, Stack Trace, Rate of Attack etc)
- Server/Services Usage (Disk, memory, CPU)

5. Process Challenges

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DEVELOPMEN

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DevOps Enabler..

Establish a process to enable people to succeed using the platform to develop Secure application

Such that;


- Constant communication and visible to all
- Ensures that tasks are testable and repeatable
- Frees up human experts to do challenging, creative work
- Allows tasks to be performed with minimal effort or cost
- Creates confidence in task success, after past repetitions
- Faster deployment, frequent quality release

6. DevOps and Acquisition

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Apply DevOps Mindset
 Understand many portfolios of work as a continuous flow of smaller efforts



Expand the collaboration, iteration, distributed (automated) governance constructs of Agile and DevOps to acquisition, needs analysis, certification, etc...

7. DevOps and Governance

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Diagrap

5

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Care

2

Compliance as Code

- Plan from beginning and carry-out throughout the lifecycle
- Enable audit log
- Design DevOps pipeline to comply with governance
- Make policy available to all stakeholders
- Implement configuration management and keep track every changes.
- Check and verify any configuration items
- Enable base configuration/OS
- Centralized and automated compliance policy

Inconsistent environments




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...

Use Infrastructure as Code (IaC)



- Environment parity throughout the development pipeline
- Develop and treat provisioning scripts as part of code repository
- Share IaC amongst the developer and IT operational teams

9. Security (RMF, ATO)

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
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6. Monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing basis including assessing control effectiveness, documenting changes to the system or its environment of operation,

conducting security impact analyses of the associated changes, and reporting the security state of the system to designated organizational officials.

5. Authorize information system operation based on a *determination* of *the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations*, and the Nation resulting from the operation of the information system and the decision that this risk is acceptable.

4. Assess the security controls using appropriate assessment procedures to determine the extent to which the **controls are implemented correctly**, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system medcrypt





1. Categorize the information system and the **information processed, stored, and transmitted** by that system based on an impact analysis

2. Select an initial set of baseline security controls for the information system based on the security categorization; tailoring and supplementing the security control baseline as needed based on an organizational assessment of risk and local conditions.

3. *Implement* the security controls and describe how *the controls are employed within the information system and its environment of operation*.

 DevSecOps is a model on integrating the software development and operational process considering security activities: requirements, design, coding, testing, delivery, deployment and incident response. Think Security from Inception to Deploy and improve on every delivery





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# Of Users	# of App	Key Cl/CD	Common Tools	Dev+O ps	Estimat ed Cost
<100	2-3	IaC, Single Cloud & App Support Monitoring and Notification	AWS, GCP, Docker, Jenkins, Nagios, PagerDuty, Slack, WikiPages, Jira, owasp zap, Twistlock	1 Dev + 1 Ops	\$350K
100- 1000	>3, <100	IaC, Hybrid Cloud & App Support, Configuration Management, Env&Pipeline Management, Release Strategies, Monitoring, Deployment Verification.	AWS, GCP, Docker, Jenkins, Nagios, PagerDuty, Slack, WikiPages, Jira, owasp zap, Twistlock, Circle CI, Sumo Logic, Logz.io, Kubernetes	3 Dev + 1 Ops	\$750K
>1000 • Dev: \$ • Platfor	>100 200K, O m deper	IaC, Hybrid Cloud & App Support, Configuration Management, Env&Pipeline Management, Release Strategies, Monitoring, Deployment Verification, Rollback, Secure Pipeline Management, Auditing and Compliance, Dashboard, Scalability, Orpanization/project segregation, multiple pipelines support.	AWS, GCP, Docker, Jenkins, Nagios, PagerDuty, Slack, WikiPages, Jira, owasp zap, Twistlock, Circle CI, Sumo Logic, Logz.io, Kubernetes, cloud fonduary, Vsphere, AppDyanmics, Dynatrace, Splunk, Chefm Ansible, HashiCorb, Xmatters, OpenShift	10 Dev + 4 Ops	\$2.600K

• Effective Usage Sustain DevOps environment • Maintaining (cost/update)

- Train Users and build DevOps skills
- All stakeholders access
- Playbook/Developers guidance
- Project startup guidance
- Project Architectural Guidance
 - Common Services,
 - Common Security approach
 - Architectural patterns
 - Test methods
- DevOps environment usage policy
 - Build and Deployment Strategies

- Waintaining (cost/update)
 Updating the environment (new
- version or security patches)Supporting new tools
- Adding/setting up new projects
- Operational Support
 - Base Image, OSS Support, Test harness, Temp Environment Creation
- Pipeline orchestration
- Securing pipeline
- Usage meter/billing support
- Auditability/log and data collection

SEI DevOps GitHub Projects

- Once Click DevOps deployment <u>https://github.com/SLS-ALL/devops-microcosm</u>
- Sample app with DevOps Process <u>https://github.com/SLS-ALL/flask api_sample</u>
 - Tagged checkpoints
 - v0.1.0: base Flask project
 - v0.2.0: Vagrant development configuration
 - v0.3.0: Test environment and Fabric deployment
 - v0.4.0: Upstart services, external configuration files
 - v0.5.0: Production environment
- On YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nQIJ-FWA5A


For more information...

DevOps: <u>https://www.sei.cmu.edu/go/devops</u> DevOps Blog: <u>https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/devops</u> Webinar : <u>https://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/webinars/index.cfm</u> Podcast : <u>https://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/podcasts/index.cfm</u>

Any Questic

Hasan Yasar

Interim Director, Lifecycle Innovation and Automation <u>hyasar@sei.cmu.edu</u> @securelifecycle



SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSPARENCY



Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

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Sr. Software and Supply Chain Assurance Prin. Eng. **Cross Cutting Solutions and Innovation Dept. Cyber Solutions Innovation Center MITRE Labs**


9TH ANNUAL CYBER

October 12th, 2021

Virtual **RESILIENCE SUMMIT**

Consortium for Information & Software Quality

Software Supply Chain Integrity




https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-21-0278-deliver-uncompromised-securing-critical-software-supply-chains.pdf

MITRE



Software Bill of Materials Standardization



Usage Scenarios Around SBOMs

Refer, Transfer or Purchase (definition of what it is)

83



A non-profit service to improve the open source software supply chain by easing the adoption of cryptographic software signing, backed by transparency log technologies




https://sigstore.dev/what is sigstore/

- **fulcio** free Root-CA for code signing certs
 - issues certificates based on an OIDC email address.
 - only signs short-lived certificates valid for under 20 minutes.

rekor – the binary transparency log project under sigstore

- client CLI (for adding an entry to a rekor transparency log)
- pluggable PKI and support present for: GPG, X.509, Minisign
- **cosign** Container Signing, Verification and Storage in an OCI registry.
 - aims to make signatures **invisible infrastructure**.
 - supports: Hardware and KMS signing, Bring-your-own PKI, OIDC PKI (Fulcio), Built-in binary transparency and timestamping service (Rekor)
 - Tested/demonstrated with the following registries:
 - 1. AWS Elastic Container Registry
 - GCP's Artifact Registry and Container Registry
 - Docker Hub 3.
 - 4. Azure Container Registry
 - JFrog Artifactory Container Registry 5.
 - The CNCF distribution/distribution Registry 6.



sigstore manifests entry into the transparency log

- 7. Gitlab Container Registry
- 8. GitHub Container Registry
- 9. The CNCF Harbor Registry
- 10. Digital Ocean Container Registry
- 11. Sonatype Nexus Container Registry



Tools and libraries to enable leveraging OCI registries for arbitrary artifacts



Open Container Initiative

https://github.com/opencontainers/


Creating open standards around container technology

OCI artifact manifest, Phase 1-Reference Types #29

The OCI artifact manifest generalizes the use of OCI image manifest, by reducing the constraints on all artifacts, enabling specific artifact-specs to set constraints for their type. Phase 1 adds support for artifacts to reference other artifacts through a subjectManifest property enabling reference graphs, as those required for secure supply chain efforts.


Phase 1: Reference Types

The PR focuses on Phase 1, enabling reference type support in 2021, supporting secure supply chain artifact types including signatures and SBoMs.



- OCI Artifacts Reference Types: github.com/opencontainers/artifacts/pull/29
- ORAS Reference Types: github.com/deislabs/oras/blob/reference-types/docs/artifact-manifest.md
- CNCF Distribution Reference Types: github.com/notaryproject/distribution/blob/prototype-2/docs/reference-types.md
- Notary v2: github.com/notaryproject/notaryproject





Oct 2016+





https://www.nist.gov/document/responses-enhancing-software-supply-chain-security-toto-team





Figure 1: Graphical depiction of the software supply chain with in-toto elements added. The project owner creates a layout with three steps, each of which will be performed by a functionary. Notice how the tag step creates foo.c and a localization file foo.po, which are fed to different steps down the chain.

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-torres-arias.pdf

Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA)







Supply Chain Integrity Model (SCIM)




Technologies leveraged:

- Attestations/Evidence, Confidential Ledgers, Hardware Roots of Trust, BOMs, CBOR (RFC 8949) and COSE (RFC 8152)
 SCIM:
- defines minimum standards around the:
 - preparation, storage, distribution, consumption, validation and evaluation of arbitrary attestations/evidence about artifacts that are critical to maintaining the integrity of supply chains
- specifies an end-to-end system for validating arbitrary artifacts in terms of supply chains whose integrity has been proven.
- is applicable to both hardware (objects in the physical world) and software (digital) artifacts.
- does not define how artifacts are produced or distributed, nor the methods by which attestations/evidence about artifacts are produced prior to preparation for inclusion in SCIM.

SCIM Usage Scenario




IETF



Trust Systems for a Supply Chain

HITACHI




https://www.iiconsortium.org/pdf/Trustworthiness_Framework_Foundations.pdf

Industry IoT Consortium



https://www.hitachi.co.jp/products/it/security/activities/digitaltrust/english/index.html

Supply Chains – As multi-Stakeholder Network



https://www.iiconsortium.org/pdf/Trustworthiness_Framework_Foundations.pdf

SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSPARENCY





Robert Martin

Sr. Software and Supply Chain Assurance Principal Eng., MITRE

Allan Friedman

Senior Advisor & Strategist, CISA

CISQ

Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

KEYNOTE:

MODERNIZATION AND DEVOPS BEST PRACTICES AT AMAZON

PRESENTED BY:

LEO ZHADANOVSKY CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, US EDUCATION AMAZON WEB SERVICES



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Who am I?

- Worked for one of the biggest AWS customers in 2012
- 8 years at AWS
 - Ensure some of our biggest customer launches go smoothly
 - Help customers build modern applications
 - Work with customers and AWS service teams to meet our customer's current and future needs



Today, we will cover

- Lessons learned at Amazon for developing and delivering software
- How to modernize your applications to take full advantage of the cloud
- How an AWS customer was able to scale successfully, despite extreme increases of demand caused by the pandemic
- Q&A



AWS in the public sector







7,500+

Government agencies

14,000+

Educational institutions

35,000+

Nonprofit organizations

Government, education, and nonprofit organizations are using AWS for digital transformation





We had three big ideas at Amazon that we have stuck with for 20+ years, and they are the reason we are successful: put the customer first, invent on our customers behalf, and be patient.

Jeffrey P. Bezos Founder Amazon.com, Inc.



Customer Case Study: Blackboard

Blackboard is a leading EdTech company, serving higher education, K– 12, business, and government clients in every region of the world

Blackboard connects a deep understanding of education with the power of technology to continuously push the boundaries of learning

150M+ users in 80+ countries learn and communicate

with Blackboard tools



Blackboard virtual classrooms



Cedarborate





Adapting to unpredictable spikes in traffic

- March Start of school year in southern hemisphere
- March 7th ,2020
 - "We must stop, contain, control, delay and reduce the impact of this virus at every opportunity." – World Heath Organization
- 4800% increase in usage on Collaborate compared to pre-pandemic

"We had entire countries shifting to online learning overnight ... not only did we have to accommodate the increased usage, but we also had to support the institutions as they shifted their entire paradigm from onsite to online learning."

Kris Stokking

VP of Software Engineering Blackboard



How did Blackboard scale?

- At first, overprovision
- Next autoscaling
- Diversify compute
- Let AWS handle undifferentiated heavy lifting
- Partner with AWS
 - Support
 - Solutions Architecture
- Learn more here: <u>https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/blackboard-ec2-case-study</u>



"AWS provides value in a way that empowers Blackboard to really focus on its core value proposition ... Blackboard is more agile and better equipped to deal with change because we're on AWS."

Kris Stokking

VP of Software Engineering Blackboard



Amazon's Modernization and DevOps Journey



One area where I think we are especially distinctive is failure. I believe we are the best place in the world to fail (we have plenty of practice!), and **failure and invention are inseparable twins**. To invent you have to experiment, and if you know in advance that it's going to work, it's not an experiment.

Jeffrey P. Bezos Founder Amazon.com, Inc.



Lessons learned at Amazon for developing and delivering software









Decompose for agility (microservices, 2-pizza teams)

Automate everything

Standardized tools

Belts and suspenders (governance, templates)


Infrastructure as code



Just starting out

This is how many web architectures started out, and it's how Amazon started too...

There any many bottlenecks, and scaling of the web server was an immediate factor





Going further

Principles


- Make units a small as possible (Primitives)
- De-couple based on scaling factors, not functions
- Each service operates independently "Communication is terrible!" —Jeff Bezos
- APIs (contracts) between services



Impact to our development




Monolith development lifecycle




Monolith development lifecycle

C This led to changes in organization



Impact to our organization

Getting (re)organized




"Two-pizza" teams

- Own a service
- Minimizes social constraints (Conway's law)
- Autonomy to make decisions




Transformation timeline



Monolithic application + teams





Microservices + 2-pizza teams



Teams Own Everything

- Planning
- Security
- Performance
- Scalability
- Deployment

- Operation
- Bugs
- Documentation
- Testing...





Now we have...





Modern applications

Today we have modern applications



- Use independently scalable
 Scale globally microservices (serverless, containers...)
- Connect through APIs
- Deliver updates continuously
- Adapt quickly to change

- Are fault tolerant
- Carefully manage state and persistence
- Have security built-in



Modernization


"How do I get to modern applications?"



Migration and Modernization Patterns

AVERAGE CUSTOMER ENVIRONMENT, BY MIGRATION PATTERN


(based on AWS experience)



Full spectrum of patterns is important for transformation – but up to ~60% of typical environment can be <u>rapidly migrated at a predictable price</u>, freeing time & budget to focus on modernization



Modernization Pathways



Martin Fowler's Strangler Pattern



"...gradually create a new system around the edges of the old, letting it grow slowly over several years until the old system is strangled."

Martin Fowler June 29, 2004



Success Stories



Built an image processing solution in just days using AWS serverless. The solution processed 50 million images in 8 days for \$6,000 and is now saving more than \$100,000 per year.



Re-architected on-premises Hadoop cluster to AWS serverless in 3 months; increased cost efficiency by 2x while handling half a trillion stock trade validations a day, improving security and compliance



Modernized and built an entirely serverless website with half the team size normally required to build and operate at their scale. Freed up engineers to focus on building out new features and innovating, and realized 84% cost savings.



Improved system uptime from 85% to 99.99% after migrating its finance reporting system from on-premises to SAP S/4HANA on AWS.



Increased SAP ERP response times by 40% while lowering costs to support supply chain initiatives.









Thank you!

Leo Zhadanovsky



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Our mission

- Our task was to improve:
 - Innovation
 - Speed
 - Agility
 - Safety


- What we did:
 - Decomposed for agility
 - Cultural and operational shift
 - Created tools for software delivery



Scaling v1

In 1998 the "Distributed Computing Manifesto" came out and we began breaking things down into separate components...

This was a bit better, still not very scalable





TESTING FOR DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION



Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

PRESENTED BY:

ENSURING SECURE & RESILIENT IT MODERNIZATION OUTCOMES

Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™

PRESENTED BY: DAVID POWNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CENTER FOR DATA-DRIVEN POLICY, MITRE

SETH CARMODY



Why IT Modernization is Important



- Strengthens security
 posture
- Reduces technical debt
- Advances mission outcomes and citizen services
- Positions us for future scalability and maintainability

CISQ Recent History Calling for Attention




CISQ Focus and Results to Date

- Business System modernization
- Cloud Migration
- Limited Mission Critical Legacy System Modernization
 - Wartime readiness
 - Tax Processing
 - Benefit programs



- Move beyond just identifying Legacy Systems
- Prioritize criteria/MITRE recent research
- Plans/transparency/accurate budgets
- Progress against plans
 - Business ownership/SW SCRM/ ISO 5055/CX






Why Healthcare Cybersecurity is Hard

medcrypt

Seth Carmody, PhD VP Regulatory Strategy

CISQ Cyber Resilience Summit October 12, 2021



INCREASED TECHNICAL DEBT

Consumers are responsible for managing security debt passed to them from producers.

PRODUCERS

MDM

Tech

No investment

REGULATORS: 🗏 🔍 FDO & Congress

🔓 HDO

CONSUMERS

🛞 Clinicians 🔰 🛋 Patients

TECHN

СA

13 7




Virtual Events Jobs Resources

Hospitals

May cyberattack cost Scripps nearly \$113M in lost revenue, more costs

by Robert King Aug 11, 2021 3:55pm



Global Edition Privacy & Security

Nevada hospital ransomware attack could affect data of 1.3M patients

An Ohio-based law firm is investigating claims on behalf of the breach victims.

By Kat Jercich | August 23, 2021 | 05:02 PM





RiskBased SECURITY

2021 Mid Year Report

Data Breach QuickView

Photo: "Welcome to Nevada " James Cridland/Elickr licensed under CC BV 21


Pacific

WELCOME TO Nevada THE_SILVER'STATE



FDA U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION






Computers Aren't Pills



Computers == Pills => FALSE

"We Need to Rethink the Whole Thing" Jeff Shuren Will Aim High on MDUFA V-Linked Reforms



----C H Z -C A

Questions?

<u>https://medcrypt.com/whitepapers-medical-</u> <u>device-thoughtleadership.html</u>

seth@medcrypt.co

medcrypt proactive healthcare cybersecurity

SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS



Consortium for Information & Software Quality [™]

PRESENTED BY: DR. BILL CURTIS LUKE MCCORMACK

THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING!



Consortium for Information & Software Quality ™